Listed developers report record FY26 pre-sales. Pre-sales is a booking number. Whether the cash arrives — collections — and where the balance sheet sits — net debt — are separate, separately-filed questions. This brief places each developer's own three filed numbers on one sheet. It ranks nothing and concludes nothing.
Godrej 58% · DLF 67% · Lodha 74% · Sobha 96% — each developer's own filed FY26 collections-to-pre-sales conversion. Four developers, three filed numbers each, placed on one sheet. The brief builds the bridge; it ranks nothing.
India's largest listed residential developers reported record FY26 pre-sales, and pre-sales is the number every results release leads with. Godrej Properties ₹34,171 crore (+16%). Macrotech / Lodha ₹20,530 crore. DLF ₹20,143 crore. Sobha ₹8,136 crore. Every figure is verbatim from a filed disclosure.
Pre-sales is a developer-defined operating metric — the rupee value of homes booked, recognised at the allotment-letter stage. It is a legitimate, RERA-era industry standard. It is also the start of a sequence, not the end of one: the cash arrives later, as collections, and the balance-sheet position at year-end — net debt or net cash — is a third number.
Each developer discloses all three numbers — pre-sales, collections, net debt — in its own filing, in its own format. They are simply never placed on one sheet. This brief, the closing brief of the RAOSCAFF real-estate Mirror Brief series, places them on one sheet for the four developers who file a clean pre-sales-to-collections pair.
For each of DLF, Lodha, Godrej, and Sobha: the FY26 pre-sales bar, the FY26 collections bar beside it, and the conversion between them — every figure each developer's own filed number. The bridge ranks nothing; it places four developers' disclosures side by side.
The bridge reads row by row. Each developer's FY26 pre-sales — the booking number — runs as the light bar. Each developer's FY26 collections — the cash actually received against those bookings — runs as the dark bar beside it. The percentage at the right is that developer's own collections-divided-by-pre-sales conversion: Godrej 58%, DLF 67%, Lodha 74%, Sobha 96%.
Every figure is verbatim from a filed FY26 quarterly. The brief does not rank these four developers, does not call any conversion ratio high or low, and does not interpret the spread between them. A developer's collections-to-pre-sales conversion depends on its construction stage, its payment-milestone structure, and its product mix — all of which differ. The bridge places four disclosures side by side; reading the bridge is the reader's.
The bridge has four developers, not six — and the reason is itself a finding. Of the listed developers that report FY26 pre-sales, not all report collections as a distinct metric, and one had not filed audited FY26 results at the time of writing.
Oberoi Realty reported FY26 pre-sales of ₹5,447 crore (+4%). It does not publish a distinct "collections" line. Oberoi discloses bookings, carpet area, revenue from operations, and net profit — but revenue from operations is an accounting-recognition figure, not cash-received-against-bookings. The two are different numbers, and this brief does not substitute one for the other. Oberoi therefore sits in this note, not in the bridge — its collections leg is not disclosed.
Prestige Estates discloses a filed FY26 pre-sales figure — ₹30,024 crore, an operational sales-bookings update reported in early April 2026, the figure M-16 and M-17 cite. What it had not filed at the time of writing was its audited FY26 financial results — the filing that carries the collections leg — with its board meeting on 21 May 2026 to consider Q4 FY26 results and the investor call on 22 May. M-21's bridge is a pre-sales-to-collections pair; Prestige has the pre-sales leg but not the collections leg, so the pair does not close. RAOSCAFF's discipline is to build the bridge only from a filed pair — so Prestige is excluded by name, with no Prestige bridge constructed. When Prestige files its audited results, the collections leg can be folded into a future update; until it files, the pair cannot be built.
Which legs of the bridge a developer discloses — and whether both legs have been filed — is part of the picture. The bridge is built only from a filed pre-sales-to-collections pair. That is why it has four rows.
| Developer | FY26 pre-sales | FY26 collections | In the bridge? |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLF | ₹20,143 cr — filed | ₹13,517 cr — filed | Yes |
| Macrotech (Lodha) | ₹20,530 cr — filed | ₹15,160 cr — filed | Yes |
| Godrej Properties | ₹34,171 cr — filed | ₹19,965 cr — filed | Yes |
| Sobha | ₹8,136 cr — filed | ₹7,798 cr — filed | Yes |
| Oberoi Realty | ₹5,447 cr — filed | Not separately disclosed | Disclosure-divergence note |
| Prestige Estates | ₹30,024 cr — filed | Audited results unfiled at writing | Excluded by name |
The third leg of the bridge is the balance-sheet position at FY26 close. Each developer discloses one — and each uses its own label and its own convention. This brief presents each verbatim, and constructs no league table: the conventions differ, and normalising them into a ranking would impose a judgement the brief does not make.
DLF disclosed its development business at zero gross debt and the group in a net-cash position of ₹14,155 crore. Macrotech (Lodha) disclosed net debt of ₹5,377 crore and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.23×, with net debt reduced by roughly ₹800 crore in the fourth quarter. Godrej Properties disclosed net debt of ₹6,414 crore at FY26 close, against ₹3,269 crore a year earlier. Sobha disclosed a net-cash-positive position of ₹800 crore and a debt-to-equity ratio of -0.17×.
Four developers, four balance-sheet labels — net cash, net debt with a ratio, net debt against a prior year, net cash with a negative ratio. Each is the developer's own disclosed figure. The reader who wants to read the third leg of the bridge reads each developer's number in the developer's own terms. M-21 places them on the page; it does not rank them.
| Developer | Balance-sheet position at FY26 close (developer's own label) |
|---|---|
| DLF | Development business at zero gross debt · group net cash ₹14,155 cr |
| Macrotech (Lodha) | Net debt ₹5,377 cr · debt-to-equity 0.23× · reduced ~₹800 cr in Q4 |
| Godrej Properties | Net debt ₹6,414 cr at FY26 close · ₹3,269 cr a year earlier |
| Sobha | Net cash positive · +₹800 cr · debt-to-equity -0.17× |
| Oberoi Realty | Total borrowings ~₹2,816 cr · debt-to-equity 0.16 |
Pre-sales is a booking. Collections is the cash received against the booking. Net debt is the balance-sheet position. Each of the four developers in this bridge — DLF, Lodha, Godrej, Sobha — discloses all three, separately, in its own filing. Placed on one sheet, the three numbers form a bridge, and the collections-to-pre-sales conversion across the four ranges from 58% to 96% in FY26. Mirror Brief 21 makes one claim: the booking number, the cash number, and the balance-sheet number are three different filed disclosures — read all three, and read each developer's against its own, not against a ranking. Every figure in this brief is verbatim from a filed quarterly. The brief builds no league table, interprets no net-debt position, and alleges nothing about any developer. It places the disclosures side by side; the reader reads the bridge.
Mirror Brief 21 closes the RAOSCAFF real-estate series. M-16 decomposed residential premium share across five publishers; M-17 separated the developer pre-sales metric from the State registration record; M-18 decomposed REIT distributions against net operating income; M-19 decomposed the mortgage K-curve; M-20 decomposed warehouse tenant concentration. M-21 returns to the listed developer and places its three self-reported numbers — booking, cash, balance sheet — on one sheet. The series began with the headline; it ends with the bridge underneath it.
None of these are recommendations. They are decompositional implications — how to read three filed numbers that are usually read one at a time.
After placing four developers' FY26 filings on one sheet, four things remain outside what public disclosure provides. Mirror Brief 21 does not estimate any of them.
One. Prestige Estates' collections and net-debt legs. Prestige's FY26 pre-sales (₹30,024 crore) is filed; its FY26 collections and net debt — disclosed only with the audited results — were unfiled at the time of writing, board meeting 21 May 2026. The pre-sales-to-collections pair does not close, so M-21 builds no Prestige bridge.
Two. Oberoi Realty collections. Not disclosed as a distinct metric. Revenue from operations is an accounting figure, not collections; M-21 does not substitute it.
Three. Delivered / completed area for DLF, Lodha, and Sobha. Only Godrej (12.1 million sq ft) discloses it in accessible coverage. M-21 does not estimate the others.
Four. A normalised cross-developer leverage comparison. Each developer discloses net debt with its own convention. M-21 presents each verbatim and constructs no ranking.
All URLs verified live by RAOSCAFF Investment Researcher Phase 0 source viability check 2026-05-21. Full URL list in FACTS.md § I. New figures added to the Cross-Brief Number Registry on M-21 publish.
Research approach. Mirror format — anchor on the listed developers' own FY26 BSE/NSE filings, place each developer's three self-reported numbers (pre-sales, collections, net debt) on one comparison sheet. No primary collection, no analyst estimates, no extrapolation.
Source standards. Every figure is verbatim from a filed FY26 / Q4 FY26 quarterly or its press coverage, fetched live by Investment Researcher Phase 0 on 2026-05-21. Cross-brief numbers reuse the RAOSCAFF Cross-Brief Number Registry byte-identical (DLF, Godrej, Lodha, Oberoi, Prestige FY26 pre-sales as cited in M-16 and M-17). Prestige Estates' audited FY26 results — carrying the collections leg — were unfiled at the time of writing; M-21 builds no Prestige bridge.
Construction. FACTS.md is the source-of-truth file. The hero is a four-developer pre-sales-to-collections bridge SVG. Phase 0 caught and corrected a structural risk: the originally-scoped six-developer waterfall does not close — Prestige's audited results were unfiled and Oberoi does not disclose collections as a distinct metric — so the brief was reframed to a four-developer bridge with Oberoi in a disclosure-divergence note and Prestige excluded by name.
Limitations. Prestige's FY26 collections and net debt are not cited — disclosed only with the audited results, unfiled at the time of writing; its pre-sales is filed. Oberoi collections is not cited (not disclosed as a distinct metric — revenue from operations is not substituted). Delivered area is disclosed only by Godrej. Net-debt conventions differ across developers and are presented verbatim, not normalised.
Editorial position. Predict-not-recommend. Defamation-disciplined, with four binding red lines observed throughout: every figure verbatim from a filed quarterly; no cross-developer ranking or league table; no causation, allegation, or market call; non-disclosure stated, never estimated. RAOSCAFF holds no advisory relationship with any developer named. The brief places filed disclosures side by side and concludes nothing about any developer's health. RAOSCAFF does not recommend purchase, sale, or holding of any security. The reader's decision is the reader's.